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February 1993POOLING SOVEREIGNTY RISKS: THE CASE OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES
AND INTERNATIONAL PERT
ABSTRACT
A model is analysed in which a sovereign country has
independent obligations to repay a creditor bank and to keep an
environmental treaty. It is shown that the linkage of both
obligations through a cross-default contract may reduce the
sovereign risk attached to both the debt and the environmental
contracts. Moreover, such a linkage will create an incentive
for the sovereign and the bank to engage in a debt-for-nature-
swap, the anticipation of which increases the initial incentive
for a cross-default contract to be entered into.The paradigm of country sovereignty, saying that nations are
essentially above the law and need therefore not honour international
contracts they are a party to, has had a substantial impact within
economic theory. Notably the theories of international borrowing and
lending (e.g. Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Kletzer, 1984; Bulow and
Rogoff, 1989; Aizenman, 1989), and of international direct investment
(e.g. Thomas and Vforrall, 1989) have been thoroughly transformed under
it. More recently the related issue of the voluntary nature of the
participation of countries in international environmental cooperation
has attracted substantial interest (e.g. Black et al., 1990; Maler,
1990, Pethig, 1992; Chander and Tulkens, 1992).
A common feature of almost all theoretical studies on the
sovereignty issue is that the analysis is artificially constrained
because one particular dimension of sovereignty is singled out and
analysed in isolation. This approach neglects the fact that countries
are usually linked in more than a single way such that sovereignty, if a
problem at all, is simultaneously a burden to several or all
international relations a country maintains. (For an exception see Cole
and Kehoe (1991), who study study reputational linkages between debt
contracts.)
In this paper we depart from this tradition. We consider a
situation in which two international relations are simultaneously
burdened by country sovereignty. The two dimensions we jointly tackle
are the dimension of international debt and the dimension of
international environmental cooperation.Recently Folmer et al (1991) have analysed the
simultaneous play of an environmental and a non-environmental
game. They argue that the introduction of a second game can
substantially alter a sovereign's decision problem concerning
the first if the two games are interconnected.
Mohr (1991) analyses a situation in which an
international environmental treaty and international
intertemporal trade are simultaneously subject to country
sovereignty. It is shown that debtor sovereignty tends to
alleviate the sovereignty problem that the environmental treaty
is burdened with. Furthermore, if debt and the environmental
treaty are strategically linked such that the sovereign cannot
discriminate between her international obligations, then the
environmental treaty may even be completely freed from
sovereingty problems. Responsible for this stabilising effect
of the debt market on the treaty are actions undertaken by
forward-looking lenders geared towards the protection of the
future value of their loans.
This protect-thy-loan mechanism has important
implications for the design of international environmental
cooperation. If policymakers achieve such a strategic linkage
between an environmental treaty and international debt then the
public good provided under the treaty is indirectly supplied by
the private sector.
However, the analysis in Mohr (1991) neglects
two important aspects. First, it concentrates on the pro-
cess of intertemporal trade and thus neglects existing old
debt. This is worrying as the protect-thy-loan mechanism
cannot accomodate sovereigns locked in a debt-stalemate.
Secondly, it abstracts from risk. Under risk competitiveloan markets accept the possibility of debt repudiation if compensated
by a sufficiently large risk premium. Under conditions of risk there is
therefore no hope that an environmental treaty's sovereignty problem can
be completely resolved by a suitable linkage to international debt
markets.
In this paper we analyse a situation in which a country is a
party to an existing debt contract as well as to an environmental
treaty, both of which are subject to sovereignty risks. We show that
even without new lending and under conditions of risk a strategic
linkage of the two international contracts can alleviate the sovereignty
problems to be faced by both the environmental agency and the lender.
The linkage we propose is attainable through a cross-default
contract. Cross-default contracts are frequently used between several
lenders to protect their individual loans against country sovereignty
(e.g. Newburg, 1991). In the present case it is, however, a cross-
default contract between the environmental agency and the lender such
that the sovereign cannot discriminate between the debt contract and the
treaty when it comes to meeting her obligations.
The cross-default contract pools the individual sovereignty
risks. We give conditions under which such a pooling reduces the
sovereignty risks to be faced by both the agency and the lender. The
pooling of sovereignty risks has an important implication. It creates
an incentive for both the sovereign and the lender to engage in a debt-
for-nature swap. Risk pooling therefore helps to overcome the claimed
and observed disincentive of lenders to donate debt they hold for a
debt-for-nature swap (Nunnemkamp, 1992).In effect the treaty, the pooling of sovereignty risks and the
induced debt-for-nature swap weave the three contractants together in a
triple of successive bilateral contracts. We analyse this nexus and
propose a set of contractual stipulations such that both parties exposed
to sovereignty risks benefit from it and such that the sovereign
maintains her ex ante incentive to join the treaty in the first place.
2. THE
We consider a two period consumption problem of a sovereign
under risk. The sovereign raises debt b in the first period to
finance consumption. Debt matures in period 2 entitling the lender to a
total repayment X(b) . Let 3x/8b > 0 . Debt repayment is to be made
by the sovereign out of exogenously given period 2 resources R .
Suppose the sovereign is a party to an environmental treaty
with an environmental agency. Further suppose that she, in order to
honour the treaty, must forsake Y(v) units of R , in period 2, where
v is the amount of environmental protection engaged in during period 1,
measured in terms of its cost. More protection in period 1 will lead to
lower costs in period 2: 9Y/3V < O.V
By definition the sovereign need not honour contracts. We
consider initially an institutional setting in which the two contracts
are strategically independent. By strategic independence we mean a
setting in which the sovereign can discriminate between contracts such
that she can violate either contract and honour the other without
thereby in any way affecting her obligations under that contract which
she decides to honour.We take it, however, that any contract violation is associated
with exogenous but randan costs to the sovereign. Let the costs of
violating either contract be proportional to period 2 resources, R .
Let the proportionality factor for a debt contract violation be 6 and
let A. be the proportionality factor for a violation of the treaty.
For simplicity it is assumed that the imposition of sanctions consequent
upon contract violation does not benefit the creditor or the agency,
although the sanctions are assumed to be credible. (If renegotiation
after contract violation is allowed for, then we interpret 6R and KR
to be the ultimate costs to the sovereign after the renegotiation
process.)
: We take it that 6 and A. are continuous random variables
jointly distributed according to the density function 0(6 , A.) where
6 E [£ , 3] , A. z [A / X] and 5 + 1 < 1 ,
2' The state of the world
(6 , A.) is revealed at the beginning of period 2.
' The sovereign's two-period consumption problem is:




where C]_ is first period consumption and we suppose 3c^/3b > 0 ,
< 0 , and period 2 consumption C2 is given by
(2) c2 = R - min[X(b) + Y(v) , 6R + Y(v) , X(b) + KR, (6 + A.)R]
Equation (2) represents the independence assumption that the violationof one contract does not affect the other contract.
Let (b*, v*) be the solution to (1). Furthermore normalise
the debt and environmental obligations so that x = X(b*)/R and
y = Y(v*)/R . Then the sovereign will honour the debt contract in
period 2 if
(3) 5 > x ,
and she will honour the treaty in period 2 if
(4) K >y .
Due to strategic independence each of the two contractual
partners of the sovereign faces the sovereignty risk independently.
With stakes outstanding the environmental agency and the lender each
have an incentive to reduce these individual risks. In the next section
we will investigate the potential for a pareto-superior risk reduction
through the pooling of the two sovereign risks.
3. CROSS-DEFAULT CONTRACTS AND THE POOLING OF SOVEREIGNTY
RISKS
The sovereignty risks can be pooled by a cross-default
contract (C.D.C.) between the environmental agency and the lender. A
C.D.C. strategically interconnects the contracts the sovereign is a
party to such that she has only the choice of honouring both or
violating both. In particular the C.D.C. might require that should the
sovereign default on either contract then both parties must imposesanctions and the sovereign suffers the consequent penalties. Hence the
sovereign is deprived of all options which strategically discriminate
between contracts.
In deciding over the joint fate of the contracts the sovereign
compares the total costs of violating both with the total costs of
honouring both. The sovereign will honour the joint contractual
obligation if
(5) 6 + A. > x + y .
The environmental agency will be prepared to agree to a C.D.C.
if its specific risk falls,3/ i.e. if
(6) prob [A. > y] < prob [6 + A. > x + y]
and the lender will agree if
(7) prob [6 > x] < prob [6 + A. > x + y] .
Risk pooling takes advantage of states of the world in which
an overkill of costs associated with a violation of the debt contract
can compensate for a deficit of deterrence against a violation of the
treaty and vice versa. One would then rightly expect that the pooling
of these risks is only Pareto superior if the individual risks are
neither "too large" or "too different". In the remainder of this
section we will derive a sufficient condition for the existence of
Pareto superior pooling of the sovereignty risks.We characterise values for x and y such that both parties
agree to a C.D.C., that is, such that (6) and (7) hold. We assume that
side-payments are not possible between the two external parties.. (If .
they were possible, then although (6) and (7) holding is sufficient for
a C.D.C. to be entered into, it would in addition be possible that one
party whose repayment probability rose substantially would be prepared
to bribe the other party into signing the C.D.C. if the latter's loss
was sufficiently small.) The locus of (x , y) values in x - y -. ••
space such that the two probabilities in (6) are equal is determinded •
by ,?.
I Z X 3
(8) l|i(y): = [ | 0(6, k) d6dA. = f f 0(6, A.) d6dA. =: T(X, y)
y 1 A max[i, min(3, x+y-A)]
And the locus of (x, y) values such that the two probabilities in (7)
are equal is determined by
I
(9) *(x): .= | | 0(3, K) dadA = t(x, y) .
A
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 1 illustrates condition (6). Without a C.D.C. the
probability that the sovereign honours the treaty is given by the
integral over that part of the support of the distribution for which
X > y . Under a C.D.C. the same probability is given by the integral
over that part of the support of the distribution which is located aboveand to the right of the line through " (x, y) with slope -1. This line
is given by (5) with equality . A C.D.C. is to the benefit of the
environmental agency in those states of the world characterised by
points in area A , as a lack of incentive to honour the treaty is more
than offset by the sanctions consequent upon a debt contract violation.
However if the state of the world is in area B the excess deterrence
against an individual violation of the treaty is more than offset by the
incentive to renege on the debt contract and the treaty will be violated
although it would not be in the absence of a C.D.C. Condition (6)
requires that the integral over A exceeds the integral over B. Likewise
condition (7) requires that the integral over area III exceeds that over
area IV.
We will make
Assumption 1: For all (6, A.)e [£, Z] X [A, X] , 0 < tf < (6(6, A.) < 3 < «
The assumption ensures that the density is bounded below and above by
some positive constants. This rules out, for example, perfect
correlation (positive or negative).4/
In the Appendix the following proposition is proved.
Proposition 1: Under Assumption 1 there exist (x, y) combinations in
the support of the distribution such that both the environmental agency
and the lender face a smaller risk under a C.D.C. and would therefore
both sign a C.D.C.10
The area of Pareto-superior risk pooling is depicted in Figure
2. The graph ty = T depicts (x, y) combinations satisfying (8).
Inequality (6) holds only to the left of this graph. The graph $ = T
depicts (x, y) combinations which satisfy (9). Inequality (7) holds
only below this graph. The intersection of the areas where both (6) and
(7) hold is given by the shaded area inside the lense enclosed by $ = T
and Hi = T in Figure 2. We can conclude that if the risk associated
with both contracts is not too great then both parties can gain by
signing a C.D.C.V
..J' •
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Combinations of (x, y) such that one party gains from a
C.D.C., and the other party is indifferent, are inside the shaded
triangles. The diagonal line through (£ , A,) is given by equality in
(5) with 6 = £ and k = A • On this line the probability of default
on the linked contract is just zero. Below it the costs of contract
violations strictly exceed the benefits. If (x, y) is in the upper-
left triangle then the environmental agency strictly prefers a C.D.C.
and the lender is indifferent. If (x, y) is in the lower-right
triangle then the agency is indifferent but the lender strictly prefers
a C.D.C.
We can also state the following (proved in the Appendix):
Corollary 1; Under Assumption 1 there exist (x, y) combinations in the
support of the distribution such that either/or both the environmental
agency and the lender would face a larger risk under a C.D.C.11
Note that the pooling of risks which are sufficiently large is
impossible even in the presence of a large negative correlation. The
intuition is that a large probability that 6 is large if A. is small
does not bring a lower risk on board the treaty if even large sanctions
emanating from a debt contract violation do not deter debt repudiation.
If (x, y) is outside the shaded areas in Figure 2 at least
one party faces a higher risk due to the introduction of the C.D.C.
itself. Nevertheless, both may eventually turn out to be better off.
This is because a C.D.C. will introduce an incentive to engage in a
debt-for-nature swap which reduces the joint risk faced by the two
parties.
4. DEBT-FOR-NATORE SWAPS IN THE PRESENCE OF A CROSS-DEFAULT
CONTRACT
Once a C.D.C. has been entered into, if the risk associated
with the environmental treaty declines, then the lender will be better
off since the two contracts are strategically linked. The lender
therefore gains a vested interest in furthering conditions that support
the sustainability of the treaty. The lender becomes the
environmentalist's friend.
Consider a debt-for-nature swap (for an overview over debt-
for-nature swap operations see e.g. Hansen, 1989). Without a C.D.C. a
lender has little overall incentive to support a swap beyond the
incentive to grant pure debt relief (e.g. Krugman, 1988) and beyond the
gains it may enjoy from improved public relations (Occhiolini, 1990).
We shall show that this is different under a C.D.C.
6/12
We are interested in swaps which require the sovereign to
engage in environmental protection such that her future burden from
honouring the treaty declines. We define a swap as a pair (Av, Ab),^
such that the period two costs of honouring the debt contract are
X(b* + Ab) and the costs of honouring the treaty are Y(v* + Av).
Hence Ab < 0 is interpreted as a reduction in outstanding debt
obligations, while Av > 0 means that the costs of honouring the
environmental treaty are reduced. However the additional environmental
protection demanded under the swap has a cost in terms of first period
consumption, which now equals ci(b*, v* + Av); i.e. it is assumed that
the swap takes place at the end of the first period when additional (or
indeed reduced) environmental effort is still feasible.
The lender benefits from a swap if the value of debt
outstanding,
(10) V = T(X', y')-R-x'/(l + i) ,
increases, where i is the risk free interest rate, x': = X(b* + Ab)/R
and y
1: = Y(v* + Av)/R . We shall consider the case where the
sovereign rationally anticipates the introduction of a C.D.C.: that is
to say, for each choice (b, v) in the first period she correctly
anticipates whether a C.D.C. will be introduced and chooses the optimum
(b*, v*) taking this into account. Thus (2) is replaced by
(2
1) c2 = R - min [X(b) + Y(v), (6 + k) R] ,
whenever (b, v) is such that a C.D.C. is introduced. We assume for
the moment that (b*, v*) is indeed such that a C.D.C. is introduced.13 biiofhak
ies insfituts fur Welhvirtschaft
We can now state (see Appendix for proof):
Proposition 2; Given (x, y) such that 0 < prob [6 + A. > x + y] < 1
and given that a C.D.C. has been agreed, there exist debt-for-nature
swaps (Av, Ab) with Av > 0 and Ab < 0 such that both the sovereign
and the lender strictly prefer to swap.
, Figure 3 illustrates the set of strictly preferred debt-for-
nature swaps. The sovereign's expected utility at (x, y) is
maintained along the indifference curve I(x, y). The sovereign's
indifference curve is decreasing as x' is reduced below x as a debt
reduction (reduction in x') needs to be compensated by increased
environmental efforts (decrease in y' below y) to maintain utility.
Above and to the left of the indifference curve passing through (x, y)
the sovereign gains from a swap.
The value of debt is maintained along the iso-value locus
V(x, y) passing through (x, y) . From (A4) in the Appendix V(x, y)
is .increasing in x' for small values of x' and decreasing in x
1
for large values of x
1. Below the iso-value locus the value of debt
exceeds V(x, y).
[FIGURE 3 ABOOT HERE]
In Figure 3 the scope for debt-for-nature swaps is depicted
for two initial values of x and y, (x^, y^) and (X2# Y2) •
 AnY
choice from points in the area enclosed by the swap indifference curve




 V2') / ^
 a Pareto-iitprovement for the parties to the swap.14
The intuition is essentially straightforward. Since v* is
optimally chosen by the sovereign in the first period, locally a small
increase in v has no first-order effect on the sovereign's utility.
For the lender, however, under a C.D.C. the increase in v reduces the
default risk and has a first-order benefit, for which the lender is
prepared to bribe the sovereign by offering a reduction in debt.v
Not every Pareto-improving departure from (x, y) is however
a rational choice for the lender. Consider for example swaps starting
from (X-L, Yi) . The falling section of the iso-value locus V(x^, y^)
corresponds to the falling section, the "wrong" side, of a debt-relief-
Laffer curve (Krugman, 1988), and for values of x, x > x , such as
x = xi , there is a debt overhang.
Being on the wrong side of the debt-relief-Laffer curve there
exist (x
1, y'), with x' < x^ and y




1) is Pareto-superior to (X]_, y^) . However, the
lender can do better than this by simply granting unilaterally a debt
relief (X]_ - x
1) . Ffence the rational lender will only agree to
Pareto-improving swaps such that x
1 < x and y' < y . We call swaps
with this property rational swaps. In Figure 3 rational debt-for-nature
swaps are points in the shaded areas. Existence of Pareto-superior
rational swaps follows from Proposition 2.
We can now state
Corollorary 2; Any Pareto-superior rational swap reduces the sovereignty
risk to be faced by the environmental agency.15
Proof: As x
1 < x and y' < y , T(X, y) < t(x', y') .
; Proposition 2 and Corollary 2 imply that the Pareto
superiority of risk pooling is not a necessary condition for the
environmental agency and the lender to engage in a C.D.C. This is
because the lender, though losing out from an initial C.D.C. in terms of
risk, can improve the value of debt by a subsequent rational swap
induced by the C.D.C. (Proposition 2). And an initial increase in the
riskiness of the treaty due to the introduction of the C.D.C. may be
over-compensated by the subsequent reduction in risk caused by a
rational swap (Corollary 2). In the next section we will derive
necessary conditions such that the parties to a C.D.C. gain from its
introduction.
5. NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF A C.D.C.
We derive conditions under which both the environmental agency
and.the lender gain from the introduction of a C.D.C. when the induced
rational debt-for-nature swap is taken into account. To that end
consider Figure 4. The loci for which (8) and (9) hold partition the
-support of the distribution into four regions.
(A) If (x, y) is in region A both parties gain from a C.D.C.
and from Proposition 2 and Corollary 2 both the lender and the agency
derive additional benefits from a rational swap. We proceed to show
that both may be able to benefit from a C.D.C. even if (x, y) is in
either region B, C, or D .
(B) Consider a point in region B such as (X]_, y\) . At16
(
xl» Yl) ' ty < T < $ , so the lender would lose from a C.D.C. in the
absence of an induced suitable swap. Taking into account the incentive
to swap subsequently we can
1 derive a necessary condition such that the
value of debt does not fall.
Consider swaps represented by points in the area enclosed by
the swap indifference curve I(xj_, yi) and the isc—value locus V(x^,
yi')/ where (x^, y^') satisfies (9), that is T(XI, yi') = $(xi) thus
restoring the value of debt before the C.D.C.8/ Hance all swaps leading
into the shaded area enclosed by I(xj_, y^) and V(x^, yi
1) make the
lender better off compared to the pre-C.D.C. situation and also benefit
the sovereign. By Corollary 2 and as (X]_, y^) is located in area B ;
the environmental agency also gains from the C.D.C. plus induced swap.. •




X2/ Y2) / ty > T > $ , so the agency would lose from a C.D.C. in the
absence of an induced suitable swap.
Consider, however, swaps leading into the shaded area enclosed
by the swap indifference curve I(X2/ Y2)i t^
6 iso-value locus V(x2, y2)
and the locus W(y2) defined as the locus of x' - y
1 conditions which
satisfy T(X', y
1) = ty(Y2) - W(y2) passes through (X2
1, y2) and is
decreasing in x
1 as a larger x
1 must be combined with a smaller y
1
to keep T(X', y
1) equal to ty(y2)« Below and to the left of W(y2)
the environmental agency faces a risk which is smaller than that before
the C.D.C. was introduced.
(D) Finally consider a point in region D such as (X3, y3). At
(X3, y3) , 1JJ > T and $ > T, as both parties to a C.D.C. would lose in
the absence of an induced swap.17
; By a combination of both the decomposition undertaken in the
case where (x, y) is in area B and the decomposition where (x, y)
is in area C we can conclude that both the lender and the agency benefit
from swaps leading into the shaded area enclosed by V(X3, y3') ,
I(x3, y3) and W(y3) .
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
We can summarise these results in
Proposition 3; If the sufficient conditions of Proposition 1 are not
met then necessary and sufficient conditions that rational debt-for-
nature swaps exist such that both the lender and the agency gain from a
C.D.C. (if such a swap is chosen) are:
(a) If (x, y) is such that ll)(y) < t(x, y) < $(x) , then
(i) I(x, y) and V(x, y') must intersect, where (x, y
1)
satisfies (9).
(b) If (x, y) is such that l|)(y) > T(X, y) > $(x), then
(ii) (x", y") must exist, satisfying T(X", y") = l|)(y) and
V(x", y") > V(x, y) and I(x", y") > I(x, y)
(c) If (x, y) is such that ^(y), $(x) > t(x, y), then (i)
and (ii) must hold.
We have demonstrated the necessary and sufficient condition
under which a swap exists which subsequent to a C.D.C. would make the
lender and agency better off. This is also a necessary condition for18
the C.D.C. to be entered into but it is not sufficient because once a
C.D.C. has been signed, there is no guarantee such a swap will be agreed
to.
For example if IJJ(y) > T(X, y) it follows under the condition
in Proposition 3 that there also exist swaps which make the parties to
it better off but the agency worse off compared to the situation before ,
the introduction of a C.D.C. (i.e. the points to the north-east of
w(y2)) . Furthermore the sovereign and the lender have no incentive to
restrict Pareto-superior swaps to the subset which satisfies (ii) in
Proposition 3(b). This needs to be ensured by a suitable contractual ..
stipulation in the C.D.C, restricting the party to the swap which is ..
also a party to the C.D.C. (i.e. the lender) to accept only swaps which,
satisfy the conditions of Proposition 3.
On the other hand, if (x, y) is such that T(X, y) < $(x)
then no restriction on Pareto-superior swaps need be written into the
C.D.C. as the party interested in the restriction is also a party to the
swap. However, if the lender's bargaining position vis-a-vis the
sovereign is weak it can guarantee itself the reservation value
$(b) • X(b)/(1 + i) by making the validity of the C.D.C. be contingent ,
on the subsequent choice of a swap from the subset which makes it at
least as well off as in the situation without a C.D.C.9/
So far we have given conditions for the existence of two
contracts which improve on the situations faced by the parties, both
being locked into contracts with a common third party which is sovereign.
In the next section we will investigate whether these contracts create
an incentive or disincentive for the sovereign to join the environmental19
treaty in the first place.
6. EFFECTS CW THE EX-rANTE INCENTIVE TO JOIN THE TREATY
A C.D.C. and an induced swap, if anticipated, have an impact
on the expected utility of the sovereign when deciding whether or not to
join the treaty. The incentive to join the treaty increases if an
anticipated C.D.C. and swap increases expected utility of joining.
Fran Proposition 2 it follows that the anticipation of a swap
itself.increases the incentive to join. However, the effect of the
C.D.C. alone, i.e. the effect of strategically linking the previously
independent contracts bearing a sovereignty risk reduces the incentive
for the sovereign to become a party to the treaty. This can be seen as
follows.
Fran (2) it follows that without a C.D.C. the sovereign has a
period 2 reservation consumption R - X(b) - Y(v) . She can also choose
from either of three additional options. The optimal choice is
illustrated in Figure 1 in which the support of the distribution is
divided by a vertical and a horizontal line passing (x, y) into four
areas I-IV. If (6 , A) turns out to be in area III or IV then the
sovereign will choose an option which discriminates between the treaty
and the debt contract. As under Assumption 1 the probability that (6 ,
A.) will be in either area III or area IV is positive the value of these
options is positive too. Under a C.D.C. the sovereign is deprived of
these options./Therefore her expected utility declines if a C.D.C. is
introduced.20
Hence, combining the two effects on the expected utility
before joining the treaty, we can conclude that the anticipation of a
C.D.C. with a subsequent swap has an ambiguous effect on the sovereign's
expected utility before joining the treaty. If the overall effect is
negative then the sovereign would choose if possible to maintain a veto
on the policy together of her obligations.
Such a veto power of the sovereign exists if international law
requires that a declaration of a contract to be in default due to a
failure to meet the sum of obligations from several contracts be
contingent on the prior consent of a contractant to the pooling of her
obligations. Nevertheless, such cross-default clauses are usually
written into debt contracts the risk of which is intended to be pooled
in a cross-default contract by a community of banks (e.g. Rosenberg,
1985; Newburg, 1991): such clauses prevent the sovereign from exercising
its veto power. Likewise the environmental agency .might well require
that participating countries include such a cross-default clause. Our
analysis shows that the agency has every incentive to do this.
Beyond the utility gains arising from an induced swap there
can exist additional incentives for the sovereign to agree to a cross-
default clause when joining the treaty. An additional incentive exists
for example if the sovereign intends to raise (more) debt after having
joined the treaty such that debt matures during the treaty's lifetime.
In this case her permission to pool sovereign risks will reduce the new
debt's risk and hence the costs of borrowing. Also, the sovereign may
be able to negotiate a rebate on future interest payments from existing
debt by permitting the pooling of the old debt's risk. Or, she may be
able to participate in some other way in the windfall she can indulge21
her old creditors.
7. cCNCUJSICftE
In this paper we analysed the feasibility of the Pareto-
superior pooling of sovereignty risks to be faced by two parties each
being locked into a different contract with a third and sovereign party.
The contracts we examined were an environmental treaty between a
sovereign and a foreign or multinational environmental agency and a debt
contract between same sovereign and a foreign lender.
We propose to supplement these contracts with a nexus of other
contracts between various subsets of the three parties involved such
that all parties can gain. At the centre of this nexus is a cross-
default contract between the agency and the lender which deprives the
sovereign of all options to discriminate between the treaty and debt
when meetingher obligations. Sufficient conditions are given such that
the cross-default contract decreases the sovereignty risks to be faced
by the agency and the lender.
This cross-default contract induces a second contract between
the lender and the sovereign which involves a debt-for-nature swap. The
induced swap provides additional gains for the agency and the lender
such that either or both can accept some direct loss in terms of risk
from the cross-default contract. To guarantee a net gain for the agency
the cross-default contract may have to stipulate a restriction on the
lender concerning its choice from the set of Pareto-superior swaps.
The sovereign loses from the direct effect of the cross-22
default contract as she is deprived of options which have positive value.
However, she gains from the induced swap and also from an improvement in
her creditworthiness due to a lower risk of debt. As the net effect on
her welfare may be negative or positive the environmental treaty must
include a clause which allows the cross-default contract to be entered
into without the consent of the sovereign.
This nexus of contracts allows some leeway in the hefty
application of politically unpopular side-payments geared towards the
contractual stabilisation of international environmental cooperation.23
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1:
Note that the locus given by (8) passes through (6 , A) /
the point such that both contracts just hold with probability one. We
proceed to show that the locus has a slope of zero at this point under
Assumption 1.
A sufficient condition for the integral over area A in Figure
1 to be larger than the integral over Area B, provided (x, y) is not
too far from (i , A) / is
(Ai) (Z - (x + y - A)) • (y - A) • 0 > (x - A)
2- 3/2 .
Consider points satisfying (y - A) = V * (
x ~ i) / where u is a
positive constant. Then (Al) becomes
(A2) (3 - x) • p • (x - i) • 0 - u • (x - i)
2 • 0 > (x - 6)
2
which must hold under Assumption 1 as x converges to jj as the second
and third terms become insignificant relative to the first. Hence
moving towards (£ , A) from the interior of the support of the
distribution in any direction parameterized by u > 0 implies that (6)
holds close enough to (£, A) • The locus of (x, y) satisfying (8)
must therefore have zero slope at (£ , A) •
Next notice that the locus also passes through (3 , X) . By
a symmetric argument its slope at (fi , X) must also be zero.24
Also by an entirely symmetric argument the locus of (x, y)
combinations satisfying (9), also passing through (i / A) and (3 , X) ,
has an infinite slope at (£ , A,) and (5 , X) .
Next notice from (8) that any (x
;, y) such that x' < x ,
where (x , y) satisfies (8), satisfies (6). Finally, notice from (9)
that any (x , y
1) such that y
1 < y , where (x , y) satisfies (9),
satisfies (7). Bance the set of points between the two loci satisfies
(6) and (7) as required. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1;
In the proof of Proposition 1 it was shown that the graph ty = T
has zero slope at (£ , X) and (3 , X) , whereas the graph $ = i has
infinite slope at these points. Hence both graphs must intersect inside
the support of the distribution such that a second lense exists where
both risks are increased under a C.D.C. By continuity of the
distribution and the existence of this intersection there must also be
areas such that either risk decreases and the other increases.
Proof of Proposition 2;
Suppose a C.D.C. has been signed but that there exist no
Pareto-improving swaps. We shall demonstrate a contradiction. First it
is shown that the sovereign's indifference curve for debt-for-nature
swaps I(x , y) has infinite slope at (x , y) . The sovereign's25
utility is u(b* , v* , Ab , Av): = EU{ci(b*, v* + Av) , C2} where





and 3u/3(Ab) is strictly negative in the interior of the support since
in some states of the world the additional obligations will be met; thus
reducing consumption.
Also at Ab = Av = 0 we have 3u/3(Av) = 3u/3v = 0 . The
latter equality follows because by assumption (b* , v*) is an optimum
which leads to a C.D.C. but does not induce a swap. Hence (b* , v*)
must optimise u(b , v, 0 , 0) which is expected utility under a C.D.C.
on the assumption of no swap: for values of (b , v) such that a C.D.C.
is not introduced the sovereign's utility is at least u(b , v , 0 , 0)
since additional default options are available in such a case, hence if
u(b , v , 0 , 0) had a higher value in such a region, such (b , v)
would certainly be preferred to the optimum (b* , v*) . Hence
3u/3v = 0 follows. Using this in the expression for the slope implies
it is infinite.
Next we show that the locus of constant value of debt
V(x , y) has finite slope. From (10)
(A4) dy
dx V constant
3T/3X T(X' . y">
3i/3y ~ 3i/3y • x26
By continuity of the density function - »•< 3T/8X < 0 and
0 < d-x/dy < °° whenever 0 < T(X' , y
1) < 1 . Hence the slope of
constant value of debt is finite whenever there is risk of contract
violation under a C.D.C. Therefore V(x , y) has a finite slope at
(x , y) . Hence there exists to the left of I(x , y) and below
V(x , y) an area representing Pareto-improving swaps. Q.E.D.27
FOOTNOTES
1/ For illustration, suppose that under the treaty an
international tradeable permit scheme or an environmental tax
system is implemented. Let h(v) be emissions of the
pollutant and let p be the permit price per unit of
pollution or the tax rate. Let e be that quantity of
emissions which can be paid for by the sovereign's share in
the total distributed quantity of permit issued or by her
share in the total tax redistribution. Then
Y(v) = p[h(v) - e] .
2/ A may be interpreted as representing non-random costs from
environmental damage as a fraction of resource R to be borne
in the wake of violating the treaty, whereas A. - A and 6
are random economic sanctions.
3/ Recall that we are assuming that in the event of contract
violation no recovery of outstanding obligations is made;
hence the objective of both external parties is to minimise
the probability of default.
4/ It is instructive however to consider these two extreme cases.
With perfect correlation such that the support of the
distribution is the line segment between (6 , A) and (Z, X) ,
for any (x, y) not in the support one of the parties it is
strictly worse off with a cross-default contract: no risk
pooling is possible. With perfect negative correlation such
that the support lies between (6, A) and (3, X) , then forany (x, y) to the south-west of the support each party gains
from the cross-default contract hence (6) and (7) are both
satisfied.
5/ Even when both probabilities are close to h this can happen.
For example if 5 =
 J5,i = O,JC =
 is,A = 0 and A. and fi
independently and uniformly distributed, we get the
IJi = T locus given by y = - x + x for 0 < x < k and
h y=l-x- (*s - x) for \ > x > h, and for
$ = T , y = (1 - 2x - (1 - 4x)
Js)/2 for 0 < h and
y = (1 - 2x + (4x - 1) )/2 for h > x > k . Along the
x = y ray (6) and (7) both hold up to x = y = k -
6/ By definition of the secondary market price of debt a lender
always has an incentive to sell debt at that price to a third
party, e.g. to a NGO, which intends to donate that debt for a
swap. Here we are concerned with incentives which go beyond
that.
7/ There is in principle a symmetric deal - a nature-for-debt
swap - which could be struck between the environmental agency
and the sovereign in the form of a reduction in the treaty
standards in exchange for reduced first-period consumption.
We shall suppose however that the environmental agreement
concerns some standard not open to renegotiation.
8/ Recall that $ , the probability that the debt contract is
honoured with independent contracts, depends only on x .
Consequently the reduction in y^ to yj_' is just sufficient29
to make the probability T of the contract with a C.D.C.
being honoured equal to $(x^) .
9/ In the absence of such a clause, once the C.D.C. has been





xl ' Yl) ' larger than that below
V(x1 , y.) . If however the lender had all the bargaining
power, for example if he could make a take-it-or-leave-it
offer, then the condition in Proposition 3(a) is also
sufficient for a C.D.C. to be signed in this region.30
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